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Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 131 
 
PROPERTY LAW:  RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
 
Summary 
 
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court 
concerning its rule against perpetuities: 
 
1. Does Nevada’s Rule Against Perpetuities (“RAP”) apply to an area-of-interest 
provision in a commercial mining agreement? 
 
2. If so, may courts reform such agreements under NRS 111.1039(2)?2 
 
The Court answered the first question in the negative, citing public policy reasons since 
the Nevada Legislature has exempted commercial, nondonative transfers from RAP.  The second 
question, as moot, was not reached. 
 
Background 
 
   Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. (“Bullion”) claims that Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. 
(“Barrick”) owes Bullion royalty payments under an area-of-interest provision in a 1979 
agreement for Barrick’s predecessor-in-interest to develop Bullion’s predecessor-in-interest’s 
mining claims.   
 
Bullion is to receive royalty payments under the agreement on production from after-
acquired claims for 99 years.  When Bullion filed suit seeking royalty payments, Barrick claimed 
the area-of-interest provision was void as violating RAP.  The federal district court granted 
summary judgment to Barrick, Bullion appealed, and the Ninth Circuit certified this questions to 
the Court. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The Nevada common-law RAP states that “[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at 
all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.”3  It is 
also codified in the Nevada Constitution4 and Nevada state law.5  The Nevada statute was not 
enacted until 1987, thus restricting the Court’s analysis to the common-law RAP.   
 
                                                          
1
  By Patrick Phippen. 
2
  The statute allows courts to reform property dispositions violating RAP in a manner which “most closely 
approximates the transferor’s manifested plan of distribution” without violating the rule.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 
111.1039(2) (West 2014).  
3
  Sarrazin v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 60 Nev. 414, 418, 111 P.2d 49, 51 (1941) (internal quotation omitted). 
4
  See NEV. CONST. art. XV, § 4. 
5
  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.1031 (West 2014). 
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 Nevada’s RAP is not static; since it is “a creature of the common law . . . [its] application 
may vary with the circumstances of time and place.”6  While common law may be adopted in 
broad form by statute, it continues to evolve as new circumstances require new application. 
 
 Nineteenth century legal dictionaries define perpetuities in reference to donative 
transfers, not commercial ones.  They do not contemplate business agreements that might outlive 
the persons executing it but do not outlive the business entities owning the interest.  They also do 
not contemplate royalty interests, which have no obvious restraint on alienation because they can 
be exchanged, bought, or sold.7  Thus, it is not obvious from the definition of perpetuity that it 
includes commercial mining interests. 
 
 The modern trend is “not to apply the rule (against perpetuities) rigidly or 
mechanistically.”  Particularly in commercial settings, courts often refuse to apply RAP where its 
public policy purposes – to curb excessive dead-hand control of property – will not be served.8  
For example, in a case similar to the instant case, a New Jersey appellate court decided that RAP 
does not apply to commercial transactions by applying a later-enacted statutory rule to a 
transaction because it “effectuated the current policy declared by the legislative body.”9   
 
 The Court thus declared that “public policy weighs against applying the rule against 
perpetuities to area-of-interest royalty agreements.”  Since the agreement at issue is commercial 
in nature, there is no human decedent exercising dead-hand control over still-living 
descendants.10  Even if the interest remains on the land, there is no prohibition against alienation 
of the interest.  The Court found no reason to disagree with the policy enshrined in statute by the 
Nevada Legislature that nondonative transfers are not subject to RAP.11   
  
Conclusion 
 
 The Court held that RAP does not apply to area-of-interest royalty provisions in 
commercial mining contracts and, because of this holding, there was no need to address the 
second certified question.   
                                                          
6
  The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, determined that “arms” in the Second Amendment was not limited to 
weapons existing in the eighteenth century.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008). 
7
  Neither Bullion nor Barrick were the original parties to the agreement, having later acquired their interests. 
8
  See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. Whiting Oil & Gas Corp., 320 P.3d 1179, 1184 (Colo. 2014). 
9
  Juliano & Sons Enterprises, Inc. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 593 A.2d 814, 818–19. 
10
  See, e.g., Atl. Richfield, 320 P.3d at 1184 (noting that the “vesting period of the common-law rule . . . makes little 
sense in the world of commercial transactions”).   
11
  NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.1037 (West 2014).   
